Understanding Behaviour: Towards Social Norms and Beyond

Source: Markus Spiske

This piece explores some ways in which other people pressure us to carry out certain behaviours. Following Cristina Bicchieri’s theory, I define descriptive norms as norms we comply with on the basis of expectations about what others do and social norms as rules we follow on the basis of what we expect others to do and believe normatively appropriate. This definition of norms allows us to understand that we can change harmful behaviours by changing people’s expectations about their network. Yet, I warn, not every behavioural prescription that looks like a (social) norm is actually one. Some actions are performed because of personal values and convictions. When this is the case, manipulating expectations about others is unlikely to bring about behavioural change and therefore more complex and nuanced strategies are required.

The Dynamics of Social Norms

In our everyday lives, we often rely on others to decide how to behave. Some behavioural patterns are defined through official rules. For example, drivers must abide by a specific code of conduct and are sanctioned if they do not do so. Several other rules – usually called ‘social norms’—are informal and not enforced through the law, but still exert a strong pressure on us. Say, for example, that you are at a party with your entire university cohort. There, everybody seems to be drinking a lot, and you decide to do the same.  If you decided not to drink, you might fear others would consider you different, strange, or even a non-authentic member of that cohort. In that scenario, we could say a norm about the appropriate drinking behaviour is in place.

But how are we to conceive of similar norms exactly? Cristina Bicchieri (2006; 2017) proposed one of the most influential theories. Bicchieri (2017) distinguishes between descriptive and social norms and defines them as a form of “interdependent” behaviour based on “social expectations”. “Empirical expectations” are beliefs about “what others do […] in similar situations” (18). Instead, “normative expectations” concern how “other people think one ought to behave” (14). Thus, a descriptive norm is a “pattern of behaviour” people conform to “on condition that they believe that most people in their reference network conform to it” (19). That is, we comply with a descriptive norm if we expect others to do the same in a similar context. Instead, social norms are based on empirical and social expectations together: we comply with the behaviour prescribed by a social norm if we think that others in our network carry out that behaviour and believe we too should carry out that behaviour (35).

Two things must be noted here. First, the “reference network” in which norms apply does not indicate society at large but “the range of people whom we care about when making particular decisions” (Bicchieri 2017, 14). This is to say that the groups we consider when deciding how to behave are context-specific and sometimes very narrowly defined. On some occasions, the norms we comply with are those in place in our families. In other cases, the expectations that guide our behaviour concern people in our city or neighbourhood (14). Sometimes, those we look at may be very distant and connected to us only through shared interests (19). Second, when we say that people comply with norms conditionally, we are saying that their “preference”—that is, choice—to comply is caused by their having certain expectations about others (26). This aspect is crucial. Norms do not just indicate what is appropriate or forbidden; they do not just exert general pressure to perform one action or the other. Nor do they indicate a merely common behaviour. What distinguishes norms is that they are caused by expectations about others. If anybody else in my town has dinner at seven and I do the same because I think this is a healthy habit, I cannot be said to be complying with a norm; in this case, my behaviour would be caused by a personal conviction. Our following a norm is instead caused by our holding certain expectations about others’ actions and, sometimes, normative opinions: were such expectations not there, we would plausibly act differently. Going back to our example, if my dinner time were defined through a descriptive norm, my decision to eat at seven would be caused by my expectation that others do the same. Accordingly, my behaviour would change in case of a change in my expectations: were I to realise that others in town started having dinner at eight, I would adjust to the new trend.

Behaviours That Harm

Some behavioural rules, such as those about the appropriate clothing to wear in the office, are neutral, as they do not significantly harm anyone. Instead, other rules harm those who comply with them. For example, pressure in favour of high alcohol consumption on campus harms the health of the students involved. Some other prescriptions demand that people be hostile to others outside of the group where the norms apply. For example, “members of group G should not engage in democratic conversation with members of group F” is a rule inciting authentic Gs to discriminate against Fs. Negative behaviours like these often correspond to complex social problems, and attempting to change them is often urgent and morally required. Difficulties in doing so depend not only on the fact that these behaviours are widely spread but also on the fact that we often fail to understand the causes behind them. Common sense tends to call any form of behavioural prescription a “norm”. In this way, it renounces the chance to fully understand people’s real motives and to find effective strategies for behavioural change. Rather, it is only a sound definition of what norms are that we can analyse and intervene on social influence. Consider our example of alcohol consumption again. If one drinks excessively because one finds it enjoyable regardless of what others think, one cannot be said to be complying with a norm. Accordingly, a change in the surrounding environment is unlikely to change that person’s drinking behaviour.  A different scenario is one where a group of university students expect others to drink a lot after classes and to believe that everyone should do so. For the sake of our example, also suppose that it is these beliefs about others (and not a personal preference) that pressure those students to drink on campus. In this case, a norm is in place: those students’ drinking behaviour is caused by expecting their peers to do and believe a certain thing about alcohol. But because their expectations cause their behaviour, changing what those students expect of others will also plausibly change what they consider appropriate to do. This is what “norm nudging” is about: manipulating people’s expectations to elicit behavioural change (Bicchieri 2023). To insist on our example, researchers were able to reduce the alcohol consumption on campus precisely by changing students’ expectations on the issue (see Haines and Spear 1996; Schroeder and Prentice 1998). Young people, researchers found, would prefer to drink less than what they feel pressured to do. By showing these results on campus, researchers manipulated students’ expectations about how many drinks others would like to consume and, consequently, managed to change overall drinking behaviour.

However, not all reiterated and common behaviours can be challenged through this type of intervention. Consider a scenario in which group F systematically discriminates against group G. Let us assume that this behaviour is due to the presence of a social norm: the Fs engage in it because they believe that most in their group discriminate against the Gs and think others should discriminate against the Gs. The reiteration of such hateful actions is likely to lead to the internalisation of the norm: the Fs start to think that acting against the Gs is a crucial part of their identity as a group. Violent acts thus become occasions for self-affirmation and to renovate one’s worth and sense of belonging to the group. The acts of discrimination performed under these new conditions are not due to social norms at all. Hostile behaviour is now not caused by expectations about what peers do or believe. On the contrary, it has become the outcome of the independent choices and direct endorsement by the individual agents. This is how identity-based hostility is concretised in practice. When we belong to a certain community, we are pressured to absorb the core values and norms attached to that identity. When we internalise such prescriptions, the latter cease to be a form of external influence and become an internal motivational force. Once this process takes place, our behaviour is not conditional, i.e., caused by expectations about other fellow members, anymore. Our preference to act is instead sustained by personal convictions—albeit shaped by our peers—that provide us with independent reasons for behaving. It is this direct endorsement of their behavioural content that makes group identities exert a pervasive influence on individuals. Indeed, if communities regulated themselves only through descriptive or social norms, they would be quite “weak”. It would suffice to change the expectations of the members of a certain group about what their peers do to change group behaviour accordingly. For example, if racism were only caused by a descriptive norm, we could end it by getting people to believe that their peers do not commit racist acts. This is a counterintuitive and reductive conclusion. In fact, racism, just like several other forms of hateful behaviour, is more complex and relies on deeply rooted practices and internalised values. To eradicate it, we have to reshape people’s moral and political views, and to do so, we need more than merely manipulating what they expect of others.

In sum, whenever we try to analyse collective behaviour, identifying the cause behind it is essential. Descriptive and social norms, I suggested following Cristina Bicchieri, indicate people’s preference to comply with a behaviour on the basis of specific expectations about others. This definition of norms is not only important on the theoretical level but also on the more practical one: it suggests paths to act on people’s expectations to try to bring about behavioural change. At the same time, I warned, common and harmful behaviours often follow different mechanisms from those of norms. Identifying the profound reasons that incite people to harm, discriminate and hate will allow us to intervene more effectively and build a better society.

References

Bicchieri, Cristina. 2006. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. New York: Cambridge University Press 

Bicchieri, Cristina. 2017. Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms. New York: Oxford University Press. 

Bicchieri, Cristina. 2023. “Norm Nudging and Twisting Preferences.” Behavioural Public Policy 7: 614-923. 

Haines M., and S. F. Spear. 1996. Changing The Perception of The Norm: A Strategy to Decrease Heavy Episodic Drinking Among College Students. Journal of American College Health 45: 134–140.

Schroeder, Charles M. and Deborah A. Prentice. 1998. “Exposing pluralistic ignorance to reduce alcohol use among college students.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 28 (23):2150-2180.